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Abstract: Dutch Book Arguments (DBAs) have been invoked to support various alleged 
requirements of rationality.  Some are plausible: probabilism and conditionalization.  Others 
may be less so: credal transparency and reflection.  Anna Mahtani has argued for a new 
understanding of DBAs which, she claims, allows us to keep the DBAs for probabilism (and 
perhaps conditionalization) and reject the DBAs for credal transparency and reflection.  I 
argue that Mahtani’s new account fails as (a) it does not support highly plausible 
requirements of rational coherence and (b) it does not succeed in undermining the DBAs for 
credal transparency or reflection. 
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DUTCH BOOKS AND LOGICAL FORM 
  
1. Dutch Books: Good and Bad 
Dutch Book Arguments (DBAs) have been invoked to support various intuitively 
plausible requirements of rationality such as the synchronic requirement of probabilism (the 
requirement that one’s credences obey the probability calculus) and the diachronic 
requirement of conditionalization (the requirement that one’s posterior credences, upon 
learning a proposition, equal one’s prior credences conditional on the proposition learned).  
They have also, however, been invoked in support of allegedly more dubious requirements 
such as synchronic credal transparency (the requirement of certainty regarding one’s 
current credences) and the diachronic requirement of reflection (the requirement that one’s 
current credence in a proposition, conditional on one’s future credence in that proposition 
being n, equal n). 
Recently, Anna Mahtani (2015) has argued for an interesting new understanding of 
DBAs on which, she claims, “we get to keep the DBAs we want and reject those that we 
don’t” (522).  More precisely, she claims that her new account yields a DBA for probablism 
but does not yield a DBA for credal transparency nor, perhaps more significantly, for 
reflection.  (She remains neutral on the status of the DBA for conditionalization, given her 
new understanding).  The core of her proposal is as follows: Instead of requiring the bookie 
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to compose her book of bets given only access (at suitable times) to the agent’s credence 
function (a mapping from propositions to degrees of confidence), as is standard in DBAs, it 
requires the bookie to compose her book of bets given access only to a different function—a 
mapping from a representation of the logical form of propositions to degrees of confidence.  The 
bookie, on this new account, must make her book against the agent given suitable access 
only to the logical form of the propositions in which the agent invests confidence and the 
degree of confidence the agent invests in those propositions. 
I shall argue here that Mahtani’s proposal fails as (a) it does not support highly 
plausible requirements of rational coherence and (b) it does not, even setting aside my first 
objection, succeed in undermining the requirement of credal transparency.  The first 
problem results from the fact that ideal rationality requires more than coherence as defined 
relative to a suitable logic.  The second problem results from the fact that the logical form of 
credences in credences is plausibly sufficiently rich to guarantee that mere knowledge of the 
logical form of the agent’s credences will suffice to enable the bookie to guarantee a loss for 
any agent failing credal transparency.  Though I shall consider only the synchronic case of 
credal transparency in detail, if my second objection is correct, it will also follow that 
Mahtani’s new account will not allow us to reject the diachronic DBA for reflection whilst 
possibly retaining the diachronic DBA for conditionalization.  This is because her account 
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gives exactly the same reason for rejecting the DBA for credal transparency as for rejecting 
the DBA for reflection.  
  
2. Simple Books and Credal Transparency 
 Consider Alan, who has a credence of 0.6 in the proposition that all whales are 
mammals and a credence of 0.5 in the proposition that not all whales are mammals.  Alan 
violates a consequence of the probability calculus, 
 
Ps,t(H) = x iff Ps,t(~H)= 1 – x. 
 
Assuming that Alan’s credences justify his accepting bets in the standard way, a bookie who 
knew only Alan’s credence function could offer Alan the following two bets which Alan 
would (we here assume along with other proponents of DBAs) regard as fair but which 
would, no matter how the world turned out, guarantee that Alan loses money and so has 
been “Dutch Booked:” 
 
BET A BET B 
All whales are 
mammals. 
$1 – $0.6  All whales are 
mammals 
-$0.5 
Not all whales 
are mammals 
-$0.6  Not all whales 
are mammals 
$1 - $0.5 
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Bet A on ‘all whales are mammals’ where Alan stakes $0.6 and wins $1 if all whales are 
mammals is fair given Alan's credence in ‘all whales are mammals.’  Bet B on ‘not all whales 
are mammals’ where Alan stakes $0.5 and wins $1 if not all whales are mammals is fair 
given his credence in ‘not all whales are mammals.’  However, he is then committed to 
regarding as fair a set of bets which, if placed and settled, guarantee that he will end up 
poorer by $0.1 regardless of whether ‘all whales are mammals’ is true or not.  This, it is plausibly 
claimed by proponents of DBAs, shows that such a set of credences is irrational.  That we 
can give such arguments for each of the axioms of the probability calculus is likewise 
plausibly thought to show that violating such axioms is irrational and so to justify 
probabilism. 
 Now, consider Charlotte, who has a credence of 0.75 that London is a capital city but 
is not certain that her current credence in that claim is 0.75.  Let us suppose that her 
credence that her credence that London is a capital city is 0.75 is 0.8 but that she is coherent 
and so her credence that her credence that London is a capital city is not 0.75 is 0.2.  
Nonetheless, she violates, 
 
CREDAL TRANSPARENCY: Ps,t(H) = x only if Ps,t(Ps,t(H) = x) = 1 
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Moreover, it seems that a DBA can be given against anyone who, like Charlotte, violates 
CREDAL TRANSPARENCY, for the bookie, knowing Charlotte’s credence function, can 
offer her the following bet: 
 
BET C 
My current credence that 
London is a capital city is 
not 0.75. 
$1 - $0.2    
My current credence that 
London is a capital city is 
0.75. 
-$0.2    
 
 
Bet C would have Charlotte staking $0.2 on ‘my current credence that London is a capital 
city is not 0.75’ and winning $1 if that is so.  Charlotte will regard Bet C as fair, given that 
her credence in ‘my current credence that London is a capital city is not 0.75’ is 0.2.  As the 
bookie, knowing only Charlotte’s credence function, knows that Charlotte’s current 
credence in ‘London is a capital city’ is in fact 0.75, she can guarantee that Charlotte will lose 
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money with Bet C no matter how the non-credal world turns out.1  Hence, it seems that 
Charlotte’s credences are incoherent or irrational just as are Alan’s in virtue justifying the 
acceptance of a set of bets guaranteed to be a losing set.   Mahtani claims that the sense in 
which a loss in guaranteed here is that “it is necessary that if Alan [or Charlotte] accepts the 
bets as fair, then he [she] will lose money on them” (523).  Put another way, Alan and 
Charlotte are both such that there is no possible world in which they regard their respective 
sets of bets as fair but those bets are not a losing set of bets. 
 
3. Mahtani’s New Account of DBAs 
Mahtani regards CREDAL TRANSPARENCY as clearly mistaken, claiming that an 
agent can be coherent without being “certain of every true claim about her own credence 
function” (524).  However, Mahtani’s argument for this claim is not convincing.  She 
suggests that coherence does not require that an agent “be certain of every true claim—and 
that seems to include claims about herself.  An agent can be coherent without being certain 
what her his or her blood group is, or whether (s)he is in love, and it seems similarly she can 
                                                          
1  See Milne (1991) for a more careful and complicated account on which Charlotte would 
also be offered two bets on ‘London is a capital city’ that cancel each other out. 
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be coherent without being certain of every true claim about her own credence function” 
(524).   
The suggested analogy here seems quite strained as not all facts about oneself are 
reasonably thought to be introspectable or, more importantly, to be the locus of evaluation 
when one’s epistemic rationality is at stake.  My blood group is not epistemically evaluable 
nor is it the sort of thing even prima facie discernable by introspection.  Indeed, Mahtani 
herself seems vaguely aware of this disanalogy when she notes that it “may be tempting to 
think there should be some sort of fit between a coherent agent’s credence function and the 
credence function (s)he thinks she has” (525) but she neglects to notice that there is no 
corresponding temptation whatsoever to think rationality alone requires a fit between one’s 
blood group and one’s credences regarding one’s blood group. 
 Regardless of the plausibility of her argument against CREDAL TRANSPARENCY, 
Mahtani is not alone in thinking that it is false and that an understanding of DBAs, such as 
the standard one above, on which it is supported, is thereby shown to be mistaken.2  She 
                                                          
2  See Christensen (2007).  See also Williamson’s (2008) technical anti-luminosity 
arguments with respect to evidential probability.  Of course, much more attention has 
been focused on diachronic principles, especially on how to plausibly distinguish the 
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argues, then, for a new understanding of DBAs on which the argument for CREDAL 
TRANSPARENCY is blocked but, as noted above, the argument for probabilism goes 
through.  On her new account, the bookie has access only a function from the logical form of 
the propositions in which the agent has some credence to her numerical degree of belief.  
The bookie is “sure of the meaning of the logical terms and he understands the structure of 
the sentences, but he does not know what the subject specific terms mean” (525-526).  If, just 
knowing the logical form of the propositions in the agent’s credence function, he can 
produce bets which the agent would accept as fair and which, no matter the interpretation of 
the statements would result in a loss, it follows that the agent is incoherent.  So, “an agent is 
shown to be incoherent [in the relevant sense] only if some book of bets that the agent 
accepts as fair will lose the agent money under any interpretation of the claims in that book of 
bets” (526). 
 Crucially, this new understanding of DBAs is alleged to preserve a DBA for 
probabilism.  Recall Alan, who has a credence of 0.6 in the proposition that all whales are 
mammals and a credence of 0.5 in the proposition that not all whales are mammals.  
Mahtani regards these two claims as having the logical form of ‘W’ and ‘~W,’ respectively.  
                                                          
DBA for the plausible principle of conditionalization from the DBA for the implausible 
principle of reflection. 
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On the new account of DBAs, the bookie does not know what ‘W’ means as it is a subject-
specific rather than logical term, but, given his understanding of the logical form of the two 
claims, he can still construct a book which Alan will regard as fair and which is guaranteed 
to lose money.  No matter what the meaning of ‘W’ is, the bookie can know that the 
credences Alan has in the propositions represented by ‘W’ and ‘~W’ are credences in two 
contradictory propositions and will commit him to the following set of losing bets, 
structurally identical to those considered earlier: 
 
BET A BET B 
W $1 – $0.6  W -$0.5 
~W -$0.6  ~W $1 - $0.5 
 
 
Notice that Alan's vulnerability to a book remains even if we regard the claims in 
question has having a logical form better captured by predicate rather than propositional 
logic, such as (∀x)(Wx ⊃ Mx) and ~(∀x)(Wx ⊃ Mx).  That this is a better representation of the 
logical form of the propositions at issue is implicit in Mahtani’s suggestion that the bookie 
does not know whether ‘all whales are mammals’ means that all whales are mammals or 
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that all fish are pencils.  Still, the bookie can know that they are logically contradictory given 
merely knowledge of their logical form. 
 Turning to the DBA for CREDAL TRANSPARENCY, Mahtani writes, “It is not 
obvious what the logical form of ‘Charlotte’s credence in L [London is a capital city] is 0.75’ . 
. .  is.  Perhaps the logical form of this sentence is just Pa . . . Or perhaps the logical form is 
Pab – or perhaps it has some other more complex logical form.  In any case, we can focus on 
an interpretation under which all the terms have their actual meanings except for the term 
‘credence’ which means ‘half credence’” (526-527), where one’s half-credence in P is half of 
one’s credence in P.  On this interpretation, the sentence ‘Charlotte’s credence in L is 0.75’ 
claims that Charlotte’s half-credence in L is 0.75 and the sentence is false.  So, it isn't true 
that the bookie can know, just by knowing the logical form of the propositions in Charlotte’s 
credence function, that the aforementioned sentence is true and so it isn't true that Bet C can 
be known by the bookie to result in a guaranteed loss.  The desirable result, according to 
Mahtani, is that her account of DBAs allows us to retain the DBA for probabilism while 
rejecting the DBA for CREDAL TRANSPARENCY.  Moreover, as the DBA for the 
diachronic version of the reflection principle also features possible wagers on claims about the 
agent’s credences, it is “decisively ruled out” (535), and for reasons have nothing to do with 
the diachronic nature of the argument.  Hence, we may leave open the possibility that the 
diachronic DBA for conditionalization is sound. 
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4. Two Problems with Mahtani’s Proposal 
As is sometimes noted, versions of probabilism differ with respect to their 
formulation of the requirement that a rational agent have a credence of 1 in some 
propositions (and so also with respect to their formulation of finite additivity).  Frequently, 
the relevant normalization axiom requires that one have a probability of 1 for all truths of 
propositional logic.  However, this is sometimes replaced with a requirement that one have 
probability of 1 for all logical truths.  This latter appears to be the conception with which 
Mahtani is working in supposing that the bookie has access only to a mapping from the 
logical form of propositions to the agent’s credence values.  Hence, it seems clear she is 
making two assumptions: 
 
[A1] Logical truths exhaust the propositions to which an agent must, on pain of 
irrationality, assign a probability of 1.  In other words, the normalization and finite 
additivity axioms of the probability axioms require that (i) if A is a logical truth, then 
P(A) = 1, and (ii) if A and B are logically incompatible, then P(A v B) = P(A) + P(B). 
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[A2] Knowledge of the logical form of the set of propositions in an agent’s credence 
function will not suffice to enable a bookie to make a book against an agent who 
violates CREDAL TRANSPARENCY. 
 
I shall argue that these assumptions are both mistaken.3 
Here are some propositions in which rationality plausibly requires certainty or 
propositional schema, instances of which require certain opinion by rational agents: 
 
[1] If P is necessary, then P is possible. 
[2] If S knows that P, then P. 
[3] If Φ is obligatory, then Φ is permissible. 
[4] Ps,t(H) = x iff Ps,t(~H)= 1 – x. 
[5] I exist. 
[6] If actually P, then P. 
[7] If x is taller than y and y is taller than z, then x is taller than z. 
[8] Nothing is red and green all over. 
 
                                                          
3 Though Mahtani is certainly not the only one to make the erroneous first assumption. 
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None of these propositions is, however, a truth of standard propositional or predicate logic.  
Insofar as it is plausible that ideal rationality requires certainty in at least these (and similar) 
propositions, a version of probabilism which restricted its certainty requirement to predicate 
logic with equality is mistaken.  Indeed, an agent who holds that some action is obligatory 
but not permissible or that she doesn't exist seems just as clearly incoherent as Alan.   
 Of course [1] – [3] are logical truths of standard modal, deontic and epistemic logics, 
[4] is a (putative) truth of the logic of credence,  [5] is a truth of indexical logic (Kaplan 1978), 
and [6] is a truth of modal logic with an actuality operator.  Mahtani might, then, take an 
expansive view of logical truth and thereby accommodate [1] – [6].  However, [7] and [8] 
and similar propositions would not be accommodated thereby even though, for example, an 
agent with a credence of 0.4 in ‘x is taller than y and y is taller than z’ but a credence of 0.2 in 
‘x is taller than y’ would be as clearly incoherent as an agent who violated one of [1] – [6]. 
Though some might be tempted by the observation that [7] and [8] should be certain 
to require that rational agents have a probability of 1 for all necessary truths, this would be a 
mistake.  One is not required by mere rationality to be certain of a posteriori necessary truths 
such as Water is H20 or Cicero is Tully.  Moreover, one is required to be certain of [5] and [6] 
even though they are not necessary truths (the logics in question failing the necessitation 
rule).  These observations suggest that the proper understanding of DBAs is that they reveal 
a rational failure in one’s system of credences which is discernable independent of a posteriori 
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information about the world outside one’s credences.  As we have seen, however, some 
such failures of rationality will not be revealed to a bookie who has knowledge merely of 
the predicate-logical form of the propositions in which one invests credence.  While this 
may be partly ameliorated by allow a richer notion of logical form, depending on how many 
of [1] – [6] (and similar claims) we take to be included in the scope of logic, it cannot be 
entirely so.  Hence, Mahtani’s new account is not a plausible account of the force of Dutch 
Book arguments for rationality constraints and assumption [A1] is false.  This is, I think, 
enough to justify rejecting her proposal. 
Turning to [A2], I take it that it is clear that Mahtani’s argument must assume that no 
representation of the logical form of ‘Charlotte’s credence that London is a capital city is 0.75’ 
suffices to reveal to the bookie that it is a proposition regarding Charlotte’s credence in a 
particular proposition where the bookie knows Charlotte’s credence in that particular 
proposition.  Of course, as Mahtani seems to recognize, it might be thought that ‘Charlotte’s 
credence that London is a capital city is 0.75’ has a number of logical forms, depending on 
the logic invoked.  Its form in propositional logic is presumably simply ‘P,’ in predicate 
logic it might be ‘Pa’ or ‘Pab,’ predicate logic with equality might yield ‘Pab = 0.8,’ etc.  Some 
hold that there is one correct logical form had by such a statement and others that there are 
a variety of logical forms.  Either way, Mahtani’s proposal is presumably that any suitable 
logical form will do.   
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This assumption is, I believe, mistaken and also undermines her case, even setting 
aside the status of non-logical a priori truths.  As noted above, logic is not exhausted by first-
order predicate logic with equality.  There are extensions of propositional and predicate 
logic such as logics of metaphysical modality, epistemic logics, and, more importantly for 
present purposes, temporal and other indexical logics, and logics of belief and credence.  
There is, moreover, no clear principled reason for excluding such logics from the scope of 
logic proper (MacFarlane 2017).  Indeed, as noted above, it would seem that Mahtani must 
accept that logic is not exhausted by propositional or predicate logic or be entirely unable to 
justify by DBA a plausible normalization axiom requiring certainty in some propositions 
which are not propositional or predicate logical truths.  However, such a broad conception 
of logic vitiates Mahtani’s attempt to prevent the bookie from being able to discern that an 
agent’s second-order credences are indeed second-order credences in her first-order 
credences in particular propositions. 
This fact, I think, will be clearer if we first attend to the fact that the relevant 
principle at issue is likely not, as we have assumed so far, 
 
CREDAL TRANSPARENCY: Ps,t(H) = x only if Ps,t(Ps,t(H) = x) = 1 
 
but rather, 
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INDEXICAL CREDAL TRANSPARENCY: Ps,t(H) = x only if Ps,t(Pmy,now(H) = x) = 1. 
 
The difference between these two claims is that the second is far more plausible as a 
principle of rationality as Charlotte need not know her name or the current time simply in 
virtue of being rational.  What is more plausible is that she, and any rational agent, must 
have an accurate grasp of her current credences, conceived of solely as her current credences 
rather than as, say, Charlotte’s credences on April 21st, 2019 at 3:01pm.  Indeed, Bet C, 
above, features such doubly indexical claims. 
In this light, the representation of the above noted proposition (‘my current credence 
that London is a capital city is 0.75’) in which Charlotte’s credence at time t is 0.8 might be 
‘Pmy,now(La) = 0.75.’  Proper names are not logical constants so while CREDAL 
TRANSPARENCY would allow for interpretations under which ‘Charlotte’ does not in fact 
designate Charlotte or some date and time term does not designate the current time, 
personal and temporal indexicals of the sort involved in INDEXICAL CREDAL 
TRANSPARENCY are plausibly logical rather than subject specific terms.  So, temporal and 
indexical logics would allow the subscript ‘my,now’ as part of the logical content of the 
proposition at issue.  Credal logics would allow the remainder of the formal representation 
but for the embedded proposition ‘La’ to count as part of the logical content of the 
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proposition.  Notice that we need not here take a stand on exactly which logic is correct in 
each of these domains.4  We need merely to hold that there are such logics and that 
representation of the logical form will include the elements just noted as logical constants.     
This, of course, does not mean that the bookie can determine (in one sense) the 
identity of the embedded proposition or grasp in propia persona the proposition in which the 
agent takes herself to have the particular current credence.  Here, however, we should recall 
that whatever the formula used to represent the logical form of ‘London is a capital city’ as 
it appears in the agent’s credence function, the same formula must appear embedded in the 
formula capturing the logical form of ‘I now have a degree of belief of 0.75 that London is a 
capital city.’  ‘Pmy,now(La) = .75’ seems a plausible candidate for the logical form of Charlotte’s 
credence that ‘her current credence in ‘London is a capital city’ is 0.75,’ while ‘La’ seems a 
plausible candidate for the logical form of Carlotte’s credence that ‘London is a capital city.’  
Hence, the bookie, while not knowing which proposition ‘La’ represents, can know that it is 
the same proposition represented both as a first-order object of credence and as the object of a 
second-order object of credence.  As a result, a bookie who knows only the logical form of 
the propositions in the agent’s credence function and her degrees of belief will know when 
                                                          
4  Similarly, epistemic logic represents ‘S knows that P’ as ‘Ks(P)’ independent of which 
axioms, such as Ks(P) ⊃ Ks(Ks(P)), are endorsed. 
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an agent's credence that she has a particular credence in a given proposition is mistaken, 
even while the bookie does not know in propia persona what proposition it is about which the 
agent has a higher-order mistaken credence.  This information suffices to permit the bookie 
to construct a bet which he can be certain is a losing bet no matter how the extra-credal 
world turns out.  The result is that Mahtani’s alternative understanding does not, in fact, 
undermine the DBAs for INDEXICAL CREDAL TRANSPARENCY or reflection (in either a 
diachronic or synchronic form). 
Perhaps an analogy involving full belief would be helpful in making my point.  
Consider a standard omissive version of Moore’s paradox in which one believes P and also 
believes that one does not believe P.  If we allow doxastic logic (logic for belief rather than 
degrees of belief) to count as logic, then one who has access merely to the logical form of the 
propositions in one’s belief function (a function mapping propositions to 1 and 0) will be 
able (knowing that it is a belief function) to determine that one’s beliefs are such that one is 
guaranteed to have a false belief.  After all, the belief function will map P and ~B(P) to 1 and 
so a bookie who knew only that she had access to the logical form of the propositions in 
one’s belief function would be able to discern, on that basis alone, and without knowing 
what proposition ‘P’ represented, that one’s belief that ~B(P) must be mistaken.  My 
suggestion above is that something similar is true given a suitable logic for degrees of belief 
claims. 
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5. Conclusion 
 I conclude that we should reject Mahtani's proposal.  The primary notion of 
rationality which DBAs aim to capture is really a kind of traditional internalist epistemic 
rationality—a rationality the contours of which are determined by introspectable and a priori 
accessible truths.  The narrower the bounds of logic, the more clearly Mahtani’s proposal is 
inadequate and even with a quite capacious account of the bounds of logic, it remains 
unacceptable.  While this problem can be remedied by returning to the old understanding of 
DBAs on which the bookie has access to the propositions in an agent’s credence function, 
such an understanding would reinstate the DBA for INDEXICAL CREDAL 
TRANSPARENCY and, if diachronic DBAs are acceptable, reflection.  The second problem 
shows that there is sufficient slack in the borders of logic that her proposal isn’t even clearly 
fit for purpose.  It remains plausible, even given her proposal, that a DBA can be made 
against an agent who violates INDEXICAL CREDAL TRANSPARENCY.  Perhaps, however, 
this shouldn’t be surprising as various normative truths regarding epistemic rationality are 
excellent candidates for broadly logical truths.  It seems, then, that we do not yet have a way 
to accept a DBA for probabilism while rejecting a DBA for introspective omniscience nor to 
accept a DBA for conditionalization while rejecting a DBA for reflection. 
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